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Patricia O’Grady
Hippias’ involvement in the conception of justice forms the philosophical topic of 
this paper.
Hippias did not, of course, invent justice. In order to understand the transition 
of Justice to justice, we need to go back to the great god, Zeus, to meet his daughter, 
Δίκη (Dike), who is the personifi cation of Justice. We will relate the notion of Justice 
as Homer and Hesiod expressed it, and trace its evolution by referring to a number 
of signifi cant Greeks up the time of Hippias in about 450 BC. Attention will be given 
to Hippias’ association with Socrates, to his (Hippias’) conception of justice, and the 
dichotomy between natural law and man-made law. 
Th is is a pitifully abbreviated chapter of a much longer work — Hippias was a 
polymath — and ancient references are meagre, but in addition to Plato and Xeno-
phon, there is a variety of sources which could be pursued in order to build a life 
of this most versatile of all the Sophists.
Th is is a story about a goddess, Δίκη, and a mortal, Hippias of Elis, who pursued 
her.
What we now regard as the wonderful exciting stories of ancient Greek mytho-
lo gy were the living religion of the Ancient Greeks, people whose lives were inti-
mately associated with the great family of gods who dwelt on Mount Olympus. 
Th e myth of Δίκη is compelling for we are informed that when mortals in-
fringed upon the traditional values she took to the mountains and then when they 
continued to violate to even a further degree, she rebuff ed them, rejecting the world 
altogether. She is now seen in the heavens as the Constellation Virgo.
Hesiod who was writing in the 8th–7th centuries BC tells us that “the deathless 
gods, the immortals, are close to us, they mingle with men and are aware of all 
those who oppress their fellows with crooked judgments, and care nothing for the 
anger of the gods” (Hesiod, Works and Days: 248–250).
Hesiod hailed from Boeotia to where his father had migrated from Asia Minor. 
Perses, Hesiod’s father, fl ed not riches, wealth and prosperity but evil penury, which 
Zeus gives to men (Hes., W. and D.: 635–637). He fl ed to escape from poverty and 
destitution, no doubt hoping for a better life in mainland Greece, but Boeotia was 
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overpopulated and less fertile. Th ey settled in “a miserable hamlet, Ascra, which is 
bad in winter, sultry in summer, and good at no time” (Hes., W. and D.: 638–640).
Hesiod was inspired by the Muses, receiving their divine inspiration on Mount 
Helicon, near his home. He introduces himself:
not as a poet, not as a thinker, but as a mere farmer who happened to receive a divine 
revelation. ... Th e new world-order, which is to replace the ancient aristocratic ideals 
portrayed in Homer’s Iliad, is all about order and justice. In his Th eogony, Hesiod writes 
what the Muses reveal to him—he organises in genealogies the numerous gods and 
goddesses from various local pantheons, in order to present the foundations of a Greek 
pan-Hellenic religion (Engel, 2004:21).
Hesiod explained:
And there is Δίκη, the virgin daughter of Zeus and Th emis, honoured and reverenced 
among the gods, and whenever anyone hurts her with lying slander, she sits beside her 
father Zeus, and tells him of men’s wicked heart, ... (Hes., W. and D.: 255–268).
So we meet Δίκη, the personifi cation of Justice. Hippias was much concerned with 
justice, and we note, also, the mention of lying slander, an evil which Hippias rec-
ognised as an injustice.
Justice, Δίκη, has been described as Zeus’ favourite child, but it is not justice for the 
weak. For justice there must be equality: only with equality can there be justice — this 
is something that will be mentioned again.
Δίκη has many meanings, and even in Homer and Hesiod this was so. It de-
scribes verdicts and decisions in law; it illustrates custom or usage; it expresses the 
 appointed way of mortals: “Odysseus wrought no wrong in deed or word to any 
man in the land, as is the wont (δίκη) of divine kings ... ” (Homer, Odyssey: 11.218).
We have Hesiod advising his brother to listen to right and not to foster violence: 
“Th e better path is to go by on the other side towards justice (δίκαια); for Justice (Δίκη) 
beats Outrage when she comes at length to the end of the race” (Hes., W. and D.: 213–
218). Th e Greeks held the utmost faith in Homer and Hesiod as conveyers of truth.
I leap forward to Tyrtaeus who fl ourished in about 640 BC (Gerber, 1999:25). 
Tyrtaeus was conscious of the social inequities and injustices that prevailed in Spa-
rta and, in a poem entitled Eunomia, put forward a claim to carry out a re-division 
of the land (Aristotle, Politics: 1306 b36). Eunomia, we recall, was a daughter of 
Zeus and Th emis, personifi ed as Law and Order (Hesiod, Th eogony: 902). 
Law and Order provides an adequate rendering of eunomia, although eunomia 
probably describes “a condition of a state in which citizens obey the law, not a con-
dition of the state in which the laws are good” (Andrewes, 1938:89).
In about 620 BC, Draco gave a new meaning to Athenian “justice”. From his 
name we obtain the adjective draconian, which translates as “excessively harsh”. 
Aristotle wrote of “the reform in the time of Draco, in which a code of laws was 
fi rst published” in 621 BC (Aristotle, Athenian Politics: XLI). Draco imposed the 
death penalty for even minor off ences such as idleness and petty theft  and when 
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challenged about the severity of his justice “replied that in his opinion the lesser 
ones deserved it, and for the greater ones no heavier penalty could be found” 
(Plutarch, Solon: XVII.2). Th is is justice in Draco’s meaning of the word, but the 
report emanates from Plutarch who, perhaps, should not be taken too literally.
With Solon, who was born in about 630 BC, we meet a very diff erent lawmaker. 
If ever Athens needed a man of exceptional abilities it was at this time, and Solon 
was certainly the man for the moment. Athens had sunk into an economic, politi-
cal and social crisis. Th e economy was based on land ownership, not on money. 
Th e economic gulf between the upper and lower classes was vast, the poor were 
deeply in debt to the rich, even pledging their very selves to their creditors, with 
some being sold into slavery overseas. Th e main cause of the anger of the lower 
classes was the excessive greed of the privileged classes, rather than the crooked 
judgments about which Hesiod wrote. Solon was “as earnest a moralist as Hesiod” 
(Vlastos, 1995:33), and from one of his verses we see that he visualized Justice as 
a divine power: “‘Wealth I desire to have; but wrongfully to get it / I do not wish. 
Justice (δίκη), even if slow, is sure’” (Plut., Sol.: II.3).
Solon wrote of those who failed to revere the goddess Δίκη (Edmonds, 1961: 
117–19). He knew of the hardships suff ered by the oppressed classes. It was prob-
ably in 594 BC that Solon, being considered “the justest and the wisest of all” (Plut., 
Sol.: XIV.3), was chosen as archon (chief magistrate) in an attempt to “set free the 
condemned debtors, divide the land anew, and make an entire change in the form 
of government” (Plut., Sol.: XIII.3).
Solon was visited by Anacharsis, a Scythian prince who laughed at Solon for 
thinking that he could check the injustice and rapacity of the citizens by writ-
ten laws, which were just like spiders’ webs (Plut., Sol.: V.2). Anacharsis was right 
because, ultimately, Solon pleased no one — in his redistribution of land the privi-
leged rich believed he had gone too far, and for the poor and enslaved he had not 
gone far enough in his attempt to alleviate the inequalities which affl  icted Athens.
Following soon aft er Solon was Anaximander of Miletus who was born in about 
610 BC. Fundamental in his theory on the nature of matter was the notion of the 
stability of existing things which he envisaged as a scientifi c process of change in 
nature, a process occurring as a natural event which he described in the rather 
poetic terms for which he is noted: “for they (the so-called elements) pay penalty 
and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of 
Time” (Simplicius in Phys. 24).
Aeschylus, an Athenian, was born c. 525 BC. He was a soldier and a dramatist, 
and a man who held a fi rm belief in the primacy of Justice and faith in Divine 
Government. It is observed that, concurrent with the development of literature, 
more frequent references to justice become apparent but, although hazy, there is a 
traceable shift  towards justice for all.
In 495 BC, Pericles was born. By about 450 BC he was the most powerful man in 
Athens, the most popular leader, and was regarded as being quite incorruptible. He 
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abolished almost all the authority of the Areopagus, and opened up the jury courts 
to the citizens. He awarded daily payments to the citizens making it possible for 
them to leave their land and other work to attend to the business of Athens. It was 
now necessary for citizens to learn how to formulate a speech, how to develop an 
argument, and how to defend themselves against charges and claims. Th is need was 
fi lled by the Sophists, men of diverse interests, but with the ability to teach. Th ey 
were the fi rst formal teachers, and many of them accumulated large fortunes.
Hippias, the most versatile of the sophists, hailed from Elis, which is the name 
of a city and a state on the Peloponnese. He was born in about 480–470 BC, which 
makes him roughly contemporary with Socrates. He was skilled in astronomy, 
geometry, arithmetic, grammar, rhythm, music, genealogy, mythology, and history, 
which includes the history of philosophy. It seems that he had lectures prepared 
in advance, so that he could speak on almost any topic that was requested in the 
various places he visited. He was sought aft er as a lecturer and became extremely 
rich. Hippias was neither the fi rst nor the best known of the Sophists but he is an 
important fi gure in the history and philosophy of the time.
We know that he spent time in Athens before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
War which raged between Athens and Sparta and their allies and subjects, from 
431–404 BC, ending in the defeat of Athens. It was one of the most tragic events 
ever to affl  ict Greece. Being a Peloponnesian, and thus a foreigner, Hippias could 
not have visited Athens during the years of the War, except during rare periods of 
truce. He would have found an exciting city, in “a period where arts and sciences 
blossomed: there existed an unprecedented level of intellectual curiosity, a ques-
tioning of superstitions and conventions, and a belief in progress. All of the arts, 
particularly the literary arts, oration and rhetoric, reached their zenith as the mas-
ters in the various disciplines competed for fame and honour” (Usher, 2005:113).
I refer now, to Xenophon and his work Memorabilia which forms part of the 
literature on Socrates, and which is an important source for research on Hippias. 
Xenophon was born in 428/7, which makes him about 29 years old when Socrates 
was executed in 399 BC. Xenophon relates Socrates’ views about justice:
Concerning Justice (Δίκη) [Socrates] did not hide his opinion but proclaimed it by his 
actions. All his private life was lawful ... [and] he chose to die through his loyalty to the 
laws rather than to live through violating them (Xenophon, Memorabilia: VI vi 1–4).
When the conversation with Hippias takes place, Hippias had not been in Athens 
for a considerable time. Socrates was decrying the fact that while craft smen had to 
learn their craft s from an expert in the area, say if one wanted to learn cobbling or 
building one would seek out a shoemaker or a builder, but “strangely enough, if you 
want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know 
not where to go for a teacher” (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 5–6).
Now in the past, Hippias had heard this same tired old discussion and question-
ing from Socrates, and said so: “Surely, not again? ... Still the same old sentiments that 
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I heard from you so long ago?” Such a rejoinder would be most pleasing to Socrates 
who replies: “Always the same and on the same topics too!” (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 6).
And this embodies his absolute belief that the question “What is Justice?” has 
not been answered. While people may state that a certain action is a just action, 
or a certain decision is a just decision, they do not defi ne “justice” itself. It can be 
said that a just man is one who acts justly, but if one does not grasp the essence of 
“justice” and if that very essence is not known, then the nature of justice cannot be 
comprehended, nor followed. At least, that is Socrates’ opinion about justice.
Hippias, too, does not recognise his ignorance of the nature of “justice”, at least 
his ignorance of the defi nition that Socrates seeks to extract from his victims. Per-
haps Hippias considered that if Socrates still had not been able to elicit the essence 
of “justice” enough debate had been devoted to the quest and too many years spent 
on it. Hippias was not concerned with a Socratic defi nition. To Hippias, justice was 
a practical issue. To Hippias it would be more productive to proceed, to progress 
to instances of justice and injustice, and how they were administered, rather than 
continue the fruitless search for the seemingly indefi nable. We may consider this 
in connection with Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (1103 b272–29), written about 
a century later: “... for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of 
knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result 
our investigation would be of no use ... ”.
Hippias now makes an astonishing statement: “As for Justice I feel confi dent that 
I can now say that which neither you nor anyone else can contradict” (Xen., Mem.: 
IV iv 7).
Th e astounded Socrates gives a mocking reply. Scornfully he pretends his de-
light with Hippias’ great discovery about Justice which would have wide ranging 
and benefi cial results: it would see juries always in agreement, citizens having no 
need to pursue litigation, cities not warring with each other. Th is is the ironical Soc-
rates pouring scorn upon Hippias but Hippias is up to the challenge. He replies:
But I vow you shall not hear unless you fi rst declare your own opinion about the nature 
of Justice; for it’s enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining every-
body, and never willing to render an account yourself, or to state an opinion about 
anything (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 9).
Th e debate continues and Socrates and Hippias engage in a discussion on “laws 
of the state” with Hippias stating that “laws of the state” are “covenants made by 
the citizens whereby (the citizens) have enacted what ought to be done and what 
ought to be avoided” (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 13).
Hippias had little regard for man-made laws, because he had observed that “the very 
men who passed them oft en reject and amend them” (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 14). Man-made 
laws, of course, are the laws by which Socrates was convicted, tried and executed. 
Natural laws are universal laws. Socrates and Xenophon agree that unwritten 
laws are divine laws that are ordained by the gods (Xen., Mem.: IV iv 19). Becoming 
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acquainted with God’s standards may be deemed an insurmountable problem, and 
there seem to be few instances of divine revelation: Two may be mentioned; we saw 
above, above, Hesiod recording in his Th eogony the laws of the gods as they were 
revealed to him by the muses; and on Mt Sinai, God’s law was dispensed to Moses 
in the form of the Ten Commandments.
Th ere is testimony that, apart from his military service, Socrates never left  Athens, 
the city-state in which he was born. Th e countryside had nothing to off er him. He 
therefore lacked the opportunities to observe at fi rst hand the way of life, the cus-
toms and traditions of societies in other states and countries. Hippias was ahead 
of Socrates in these experiences. He had travelled widely and this opened up many 
opportunities for him to observe diff erent societies, their customs and the manner 
in which they dispensed justice.
We move now to Plato’s dialogues, Hippias Major and Hippias Minor. Th e dra-
matic date of Hippias Major is probably in the Peace of Nicias, between 421–416 
BC, with Hippias Minor being two days later. 
Th e former commences with Socrates greeting Hippias, commenting that it had 
been a long time since Hippias had been in Athens. Hippias explains that he is too 
busy, frequently acting as an envoy for Elis, because his countrymen regard him as 
the most able person to represent them. 
We may accept that Hippias had the qualities necessary in an envoy and it seems 
evident that Socrates lacked the very qualities that made Hippias so suitable — 
Socra tes would irritate and frustrate the very people he was meant to appease, and 
get bogged down in discussions on the essence of virtue and justice and so on.
In Hippias Major we learn that during the visit to Athens, Hippias is to deliver a 
discourse at the invitation of a certain Eudicus. Th is talk, or exhibition, was already 
prepared, having previously been presented at Sparta. It explained the noble pur-
suits a young man should follow. Hippias summarises the lecture which is known 
as the Trojan Discourse:
I recount how, when Troy had been captured, Neoptolemus asks Nestor what type of 
noble pursuits could give the one who practises them a fi ne reputation, even if he is 
young. And, in response, Nestor laid out for him a whole collection of very noble cus-
toms (Pl., Hp. Ma.: 286 B).
Th is is surely admirable and, although we do not know just what advice Nestor 
gave, we may be certain that it related to virtue and courage, and that it was not 
sophistry.
Hippias speaks: “I say that Homer made Achilles the best man of those who 
went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest” (Pl., Hp. Mi.: 364 C). 
Th e revered Nestor was the king of Pylos, a region which bordered Elis. Odysseus 
was the son of Laertes, the king of Ithaca, and husband of Penelope. Ithaca is less 
than one hundred kilometres to the north-west of Elis. Achilles was the son of 
the goddess, Th etis, but he was a man, real or imaginary, not a god. His name may 
have a connection with the river Achelous, which is in mainland Greece, east of 
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Ithaca. One may believe that Hippias would have sought out the stories of Nestor 
in neighbouring Pylos, and of Odysseus and Achilles in near-by areas. Th ey would 
have been very real people in his lectures. Hippias surely knew much more than we 
now do about these characters, and one may envisage lively lectures in which the 
virtues, vices, strengths and weaknesses of Nestor, Achilles, and Odysseus provided 
examples of the noble pursuits which featured in Hippias’ discourse. 
Plutarch records that Hippias declared slander to be a “dreadful thing”, worse 
than violence, because slander is so underhand (Plut., On Calumniating: fr. 156).
On the basis of the testimony that I have collected, I contend that the concept of 
justice was a critical issue in the philosophy of Hippias. Th ere remains much to be 
said on this topic, but this must await another, longer paper.
Let us consider just two instances of present-day justice. In 1983, Australians 
witnessed the conservationist case relating to the proposed construction of a dam 
in Tasmania, known as the Gordon below Franklin Dam (See the absorbing web 
site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franklin_Dam).
By a majority of four to three the High Court of Australia found that the Com-
monwealth Government had the power to over-ride the Tasmanian government. 
Th e Franklin and Gordon Rivers were saved. But what should one make of four 
votes to three? Th is result indicates no more than the strength of four personal 
views — the decision of one judge prevailed. Can that be regarded as justice?
I refer to the US Presidential Election of 2000: Bush vs. Gore. Th e fi nal result 
depended on the Florida count. George W. was declared the narrow winner, and 
therefore was in a position to claim the Presidency. However, the Florida result 
was disputed by the Democrat Campaign, mainly because of the manner in which 
certain machine-punched votes were excluded. Th e case was taken to the Florida 
Supreme Court which ordered a statewide recount. Th e Republican Campaign 
appealed against the decision to the US Supreme Court, which ordered that the 
recount be stopped. Th is, in eff ect, declared George W. the victor. Th e US Supreme 
Court decision was split fi ve votes to four. 
Th e majority decision was fundamentally that the recount would take too much 
time. However, each of the Judges wrote a separate rationale for the judgements, 
which were all very murky and infl uenced by partisan considerations. Th is is an 
example of a supposedly just outcome arising from a mish-mash of confl icting con-
siderations that had little to do with anything that has any claim to be “real” justice.
So what is justice? Is it subjective, and must man face the appalling possibility 
that there are no absolutes? — is man the measure of all things, as Protagoras claim-
ed? Is it god’s law, or natural law? Indeed, is justice defi nable, or even knowable?
We read and hear of people who claim “I want to see justice done”; “I just want 
a little justice”; “Th ere is no justice in that”. We still seeks that elusive goddess Jus-
tice, but until men and women in all societies in all nations can reach agreement, 
until equality is established and maintained, there will be no justice, and Δίκη will 
re main inaccessible in the sky as the Constellation, Virgo. 
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